Out of the Cloud and Into the Courts: Need of Legislation to Govern the Online Trading Platforms for the 21st Century Economy

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1. Abstract:

As India emerges as the world's third largest economy, the significantly increasing contribution of electronic commerce necessitates a robust, centralized statutory framework. This research paper advocates for the formation of e commerce governance through law and a quasi-judicial central authority dedicated exclusively to digital trade governance, oversight, and dispute resolution. Current regulatory loopholes, including the safe harbour shield protecting platforms from counterfeit goods liability and the platform neutrality paradox enabling self-preferencing, demand immediate legislative action. Furthermore, we must address behavioural exploitation through dark patterns by integrating behavioural antitrust measures and eradicate discriminatory pricing practices like the pink tax. Consumer should mandatorily and must be modernized by mandating person to person consumer care, ensuring universal item returnability excluding sensitive goods, addressing non-returnable tiny electronics, and enforcing vicarious manufacturer liability with automatic, unregistered product guarantees. By analysing the trends, market places, and unsatisfied consumers of e commerce are desperately raise questions on e-commerce platforms policies like extra cash on delivery charges versus UPI, this research paper proposes a comprehensive central statute completely banning hazardous items to fortify digital markets.

2. Introduction:

India's rapid e-commerce expansion is a driving force behind its economic growth, yet this technological boom has vastly outpaced existing legal frameworks, leaving digital trade in a regulatory vacuum. Governed by an inadequate patchwork of legacy laws, massive marketplaces function with minimal accountability, creating an ecosystem that systemically disadvantages consumers and smaller merchants. Platforms often also play both marketplace, seller and competitor at once, and rely on outdated safe harbours in terms of protection for goods sold which are fake or faulty. In addition, the market is also being described in this new digitally expanded format as being dominated by exploitation: "The online market of the present often consists of manipulative practices through "dark patterns" in terms of the manipulation into buying, discrimination of the customer through price differentiation (pink tax) as well as the reduction of the customer's consultation to an impersonated chatbot"

This systemic failure requires significant and unified statutory reform rather than piecemeal solutions. Creation of a stand-alone, Centralized Statutory Framework for Digital Markets is a clear legal imperative for digital economy fairness, transparency and regulatory oversight. This singular central statute will embed concepts of shared vicarious liability, penalize deceptive interface designs using behavioural antitrust laws and provide a specific e-commerce judicial or quasi-judicial body. Coupled with mandatory access to human customer service and an unequivocal guarantee that goods are returnable with a proscription on the selling of dangerous goods, this new digital economy law will fill the void between innovation and statute.

3. Literature review

3.1 Competition Commission of India (2020)

It also sets out a domestic reference point for digital regulatory transitions by detailing the significant disparities in bargaining power and information between e-commerce platforms and their business users. More pointedly, the report confirms many of the unfair practices hindering true market contestability from deep discounting, unfair terms in platform-business agreements and, perhaps, a basic lack of neutrality by platforms demonstrating a well-supported case for the establishment of a specific antitrust authority to tackle the burgeoning market with new governance mechanisms for dealing with antitrust disputes.

3.2 European Centre for International Political Economy

In exploring the platform neutrality conundrum, we consider the European Digital Markets Act as the quintessential ‘state of the art’ approach to ex-ante, pre-emptive regulation. Scholars agree that substantial structural remedies and limitations on data combining are the only way that giant gatekeeper firms would not use algorithmic self-preferencing to divert attention from and favour their own retail products against third-party sellers. Europe's current stance serves as a strong, positive structural precedent for a central Indian statute that could neutralize algorithmic bias.

3.3 The Amikus Qriae

The present article provides a detailed analysis on how we must ditch the archaic intermediary immunity and switch towards vicarious liability. The current protections that exist in Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000 is now redundant because as the e-commerce magnates in the 21st century can influence Payments, Logistics and Returns on their platform; therefore as they have complete control over the process and facilitation of transactions, they should be held liable for IP infringement as well as counterfeit products and our approach in integrating Shared Liability and Auto product guarantee finds support in this literature.

3.4 Securiti

We reveal how consumers have been made both economically and psychologically exploited, referring to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) work to outline how a vast range of digital interfaces, that employ techniques such as forcing consumers into unwanted actions, manipulating the user-interface to nudge them in a desired direction, and Sneak-in a transaction by not fully displaying the true costs, are deployed to limit their choices. The existing legislation always lies in the grey area of virtue., but the currently govern legislation providing inadequateness and covering them and recommend them to introduce behavioural principles which are always having antitrust in each and every country which is in existing in world.

3.5 International Journal of Indian Psychology

The enduring examination on discriminatory patterns of pricing on digital bazzar, found and extremely highlights that the pink tax imposition on male and for female items which are for their personal use are function similarly and that's why these intensify algorithm always favour the hidden tax and give the liberty to the gender bias and consumers are paying higher taxes and that's why this failure exposed and conclude automated AI enabled services of consumers. This practice deeply highlights the issues which are based on discrimination and not perform well on issue of human-to-human customer care support.

3.6 Journal of Business Ethics

The analysis observed by the empirical study reveals that digital payments methods performing mis matches and customer grievances are increase day by day and that's why Consumer Protection Act 2019 playing a vital role into it. Illustration of COD costs low trust and find out as disproportionate transactions. As the same results for UPI also didn't perform well and spreading unfairness practices. Human backed this literature is favouring the customer support is ultimate backbone of consumer trust.

4. Goals of the Study

- Developing a Unified Governance Regime
- Breaking the "Platform Neutrality" Paradox
- Redefining intermediary and product liability
- Adopting behavioural antitrust & Eliminating Price discrimination
- Modernizing dispute settlement and Transactional fairness

5. Research methodology

1. Doctrinal research methodology

This research methodology identifies the legal basis of a centralized structure, in the absence of existing statutory gaps. This research Methodology attacks existing safe harbour mechanisms such as section 79 of IT Act and relies on the institutional report (CCI, OECD) to bring out the antitrust and consumer protection issues caused due to the absence of existing statute. It juxtaposes and contrasts the international measures like EU Digital Markets Act to build up structurally legal solutions against algorithmic self-preferencing and paradoxical phenomenon of platform neutrality.

2. **Non-Doctrinal research methodology**

This evidence based, socio legal approach grounds the theoretical claims in real world consumer experiences. By analysing psychosocial market studies, it quantifies the practical harm caused by manipulative dark patterns, the discriminatory pink tax, and unfair payment policies (COD vs. UPI). This empirical evidence directly justifies the push for vicarious liability, mandatory human customer care, and a dedicated e-commerce oversight authority.

6. Research problem

Despite India's rapid e-commerce-driven economic growth, a critical regulatory vacuum governed by fragmented, archaic laws such as the outdated safe harbour shield under the IT Act allows massive online marketplaces to systemically exploit both smaller merchants and digital consumers. Utilizing a mixed methodology approach that combines doctrinal legal analysis of international precedents like the EU Digital Markets Act with empirical socio legal scrutiny of consumer grievances, this research exposes how dominant gatekeepers weaponize algorithmic self-preferencing to stifle competition, evade vicarious liability for hazardous goods, and deploy manipulative dark patterns alongside discriminatory pricing models like the pink tax. To combat this unchecked monopolistic and psychological exploitation, this paper argues that it is an absolute legal necessity to bridge the widening gap between technological advancement and statutory stagnation by enacting a comprehensive, quasi-judicial central framework; one that enforces automatic product accountability, embeds behavioural antitrust measures, and mandates transparent, person to person grievance redressal to restore equitable trust in the 21st century digital marketplace.

7. Hypothesis

Hypothesis - 1 - Efficacy of a Centralized Statutory Framework

Enacting a comprehensive, centralized e-commerce statute governed by a dedicated authority will close existing regulatory loopholes. For ensuring the higher level compliance of codify law can regulate the overshadowed unfairness and easily coup up with improperness of resolution markets and be a remedy for the current new age digital markets and can curb the consumer trust which is found imbalance in the market.

Hypothesis - 2 - Breaking Down the Platform Neutrality Paradox

Algorithmic self-preferencing would be prohibited from e-commerce giants as a result of specific structural rules, thereby deactivating the platform neutrality paradox and levelling the competitive playing field of local traders by separating the roles of market places.

Hypothesis - 3 - Repercussions of the Liability Approach on Consumer Protection

A new framework based on vicarious liability, substituting current 'safe harbour' provisions, is bound to ensure fewer counterfeit and unsafe products entering the supply chain. It is designed to compel legal frameworks on platforms and manufacturers through which it establishes common liability for ensuring that products supplied are safe, mandatory insurance of products, and stringent checking of product quality.

Hypothesis - 4 - Eliminating consumer exploitation with behavioural antitrust

Incorporate a consumer protective stance to address the exploitation of digital consumers by prohibiting misleading choice architecture mechanisms (e.g. Dark patterns), and eliminate discriminatory practices, such as the pink tax. Additionally, a consumer protective stance requires human interaction with the consumers as opposed to artificial intelligence for consumer care and resolution of arbitrary policies of a platform.

8. The Numbers

Customer Issue	Percentage Metric	Estimated Affected Customers (India)	Real-World Impact	Source
Customer Care Services (Dissatisfaction & Grievances)	34.2% (of surveyed consumers)	~ 102,600,000	Consumers report being actively unhappy with post-purchase e-commerce support, refund delays, and dispute resolution.	Khatana & Kamra (2025)
Systemic Pricing Bias (Algorithmic Discrimination)	69% (of Indian platforms)	~ 207,000,000	Algorithms dynamically alter and inflate prices at the final checkout stage (via	Local Circles (2025)

			undisclosed processing, convenience, or weather surge fees), exploiting consumer commitment and sometimes doubling the initial base price.	
Vicarious Liability (Counterfeit & Hazardous Goods)	20% (of online shoppers)	~ 60,000,000	Consumers suffer financial or physical harm from unverified third-party goods, while platforms evade accountability by claiming Section 79 "safe harbour" intermediary status.	Majithia (2019)
Dark Pattern Manipulation	88% (of online shoppers)	~ 264,000,000	Consumers are actively misled by deceptive user interfaces (such as subscription	Datum Intelligence (2026)

			traps and forced action), leading to collective annual financial losses of ₹25,000 to ₹28,000 crore in the Indian digital economy.	
Discriminatory Pricing (Pink Tax / Gender Bias)	19.4% (average price premium)	~ 135,000,000 (female portion of user base)	Indian female consumers systematically pay a 19.4% premium on female-marketed items (rising to 24.2% for personal care), causing estimated lifetime financial losses of ₹2.1 to ₹2.8 lakhs per consumer.	Panigrahi & Ansari (2025)

9. Findings

9.1 Curb The Gap Between Governance and Law

Rapid digitization has left India's legal frameworks behind, leading to regulatory paralysis and the disenfranchisement of small businesses and individuals, in addition to a lack of enforcement. To regulate the market especially for digital transaction can ensure the trust by comprehensive quasi-judicial special featured law.

9.2 Paradox of Neutrality Gaming

By being a 2 side of 1-coin leading e market giants developed operating paradox and give the open platforms to sellers that they can set priority for their own products and by pushing the algorithm the situation was choked foe meaningful competition. The structural policy was ahead of intervention and considering the European Union Digital Markets Act gives the mandate to take action for prevention of this abusive performance and helps to scales and favouring small bure balance with fairness.

9.3 End of Safe Harbour

The abandon and obsolescent Safe harbour vests in a vicarious liability under the regime of IT act section 79 and the E commerce business getting the shield from being a responsible and to make their self as a counterfeit. The unsafe goods and the products which are sold on a marketplace the platform share the vicarious liability framework for E commerce and by this vicarious liability ensures that due diligence play a vital role when sellers are protecting consumers., and by practicing this the safe harbour is going to be end.

9.4 Unchecked behavioural manipulation and pricing discrimination

"Dark patterns" or deceptive interface designs are rampant on digital markets to trick consumers and force unwanted purchasing. And discriminatory pricing, such as the "pink tax" is commonly seen as well. Competition laws need to take the step towards behavioural antitrust that expressly punish interface designs and psychological games aiming to abuse customers.

9.5 Systematic Deficiencies in grievance Redressal & Transactional equity

A massive dependence on auto AI customer service, arbitrary charging of extra fees on Cash on delivery, and arbitrary denial of product returns has badly hit consumer confidence. A Law is needed which enforces customer access to Human customer service & universal returnability of products.

10.Recommendations

10.1.Adopt a Harmonised E-Commerce Governance Statute

There needs to be a comprehensive digital trade law to cover the existing legislative fragmentation. The legislature should consider codifying the numerous, anachronistic existing legal frameworks into a digital trade statute that spans the burgeoning space of rapidly evolving digital technologies and the inertia of legislative processes. This is a legal requirement to deliver transparency, fairness and security into the twenty first century digital economy.

10.2.Create A Specific Quasi-Judicial Central Authority

Central Act would need to provide for establishment of a standalone, quasi-judicial governance entity solely dedicated for supervision and rapid dispute settlement in e-commerce.

Such body would be singularly positioned to continuously monitor systematically prevalent malpractices in the market and to bring about enforcement of law with adequate leverage against the multinational digital behemoths. The existing half-baked amendments to disparate statutes can be a readily superseded arrangement with centralized governance body.

10.3.Enact ex-ante structural remedies to promote platform neutrality

Legislators need to enact prescriptive structural rules to kill the platform neutrality contradiction once and for all. In many countries (e.g. European Union Digital Markets Act), major gatekeeper platforms will be required to not simultaneously play neutral facilitating and aggressive competitive retailer's roles. In essence, we should ban all forms of algorithmic self-preferencing from interfering with domestic vendors.

10.4.Safe Harbor Immunity for "Big Tech" Should Be Replaced with Shared Vicarious Liability

Current Section 79 safe harbour should be abolished for a handful of prominent active e-commerce operators which now dominate and tightly control, or have extensive oversight over, all logistic and transaction chains for consumers and providers. We need a structural remedy, requiring these online marketplace platforms and brand owners to share rigorous, extensive, and enforced, via a framework of shared vicarious liability, for the products and goods which they sell or provide, or which are made available via their platforms, to all consumer.

10.5.Codify Behavioural Antitrust for Punitive Dark Pattern Conduct Behavioural

By concentrating and the criminalize antitrust must be come into the national framework of a competition especially address the exploitation issue on a digital consumer psychology. The behavioural choice is clearly stated by the law and involve the deception of a psychology which are driven by pre commitment and manipulation forced hidden churches and manipulate the interface and taking the re-cognization of unfair trade practice which is very serious. In this new era there is a wide requirement of a techno legal audit that ensures detection of the systematic behavioural and address the manipulation and buy the new law it is going to be sanctioned that types of this E offenses are comes under the legal spots.

10.6.Dismantle Algorithmic Discriminatory Pricing and the Pink Tax

The unequivocally is become the concentrated new point of law and by creating the new framework and infrastructure having the potential to curb the algorithms that are used norms of the societal arbitrary and the taking the money from over another social group and they are charging so many additional things on the real price tag. There is a need of hour to put a regulation by on a very rigorous way to curb the pink tax. So, by the all genders Are falling under the same equivalent category for each and every good which are purely Become a strategy. Consumers will benefit from these changes by no longer implicitly subsidizing online marketplaces' profiteering at our own expense.

10.7.Mandate Accessible Person-to-Person Grievance Redressal

The law has to mandate human driven accessible dispute resolution as an up-to-date response and to recreate lost confidence within marketplace as automated or wholly artificial intelligent solutions prove consistently unsatisfactory for most complaints.

10.8.Rationalize Transactional Equity and Universal Returnability

All attempts must be made to ensure mandatory Universal Item Returnability, plugging any loopholes currently in the governance framework allowing platform to reject returns of non-sensitive items and small electronics. The legislation should also completely prohibit the imposition of biased charges like overhanding fees on cash on delivery (COD) against UPI based payments. Ensuring standardized transactional policies shall go a long way to plug digital distrust and to provide consumers with their right to fair transactions.

11.Significance of the Contribution of this Paper

11.1.Laying the Framework for a Centrally Governed E-Commerce Regime

A Critical legislative framework for replacing India's fragmented and obsolete legislation with a unified central code is proposed in the present research paper. By proposing the formation of a quasi-judicial watchdog, it shifts the discussion from piecemeal remedies to systematic and anticipatory legal interventions, which is a major contribution of this work. By providing the policymakers with a codex framework for governing the runaway e-commerce sector with compliance and cross border accountability, this work may be utilized for addressing the current legislative gap.

11.2.Platform Neutrality Paradox with Ex-Ante Solutions

This paper's most critical output would be its structural suggestions towards neutralizing the paradox of platform neutrality by having these digital gatekeepers as both, neutral enablers and dominant players. Using international precedence of the EU's DMA, this paper sets out to empower Indian law makers with an enforceable and structural ex-ante tool of an explicit algorithmic anti-self-preferencing law. This article would add meaningfully to the contemporary competition law canon, by dealing directly with algorithmic bias, and establishing a concrete and viable enforcement tool to safeguard nascent Indian entrepreneurs in these dominated marketplaces and to establish a fair and square battlefield.

11.3.A New Model of Intermediary Liability in the Digital Age

The report's proposal for direct shared liability of manufacturer/retailer platforms against harmful goods poses an alternative to the obsolescent 'safe harbour' provisions for intermediary platforms in s 79 of the IT Act.132 The structural and systemic reform it introduces towards joint shared liability would be revolutionary within contemporary consumer safety law, by entrenching for the first time an explicit, binding legal requirement on manufacturers to screen their supply chains effectively and to automatically provide a product guarantee, by virtue of the platform's tight commercial grip over product sales and consumer choice.

11.4.Behavioural antitrust: addressing psychologically exploitative practices.

By illustrating how dark patterns and price discrimination practices such as the pink tax operate, this paper proposes to build behavioural antitrust practices into our domestic legal regime of e-commerce regulation. Traditional competition law concepts must extend to regulate not only monetary but also cognitive manipulation, thus specifically proscribing exploitative choice architectures. This makes a highly significant contribution to socio-legal studies by targeting abuses that evade traditional consumer protection laws. It offers regulators a practical approach to mandate techno-legal audits and criminalize algorithmic exploitation operating in current legal grey areas.

11.5.Modernizing Grievance Redressal and Transactional Equity

Grounding theoretical legal gaps in empirical consumer experiences, this research delivers actionable frameworks to eliminate transactional disparities, such as unjustified financial penalties on Cash on Delivery orders. Furthermore, it advocates for a definitive legal mandate requiring accessible, person-to-person grievance redressal to counter the industry's overreliance on ineffective automated AI support. This empirical-to-legal contribution is essential for bridging the widening digital trust deficit in modern markets. It provides lawmakers with concrete, enforceable policies to ensure universal item returnability and guarantee equitable financial interactions for all consumers.

12.Policy Implications of the Study after significance

12.1.Restructuring Institutions and building a Centralized Digital Regime

The research suggests a paradigm shift from the current inter- ministerial and fractured regulatory model for India to one central administrative regime with a centralized quasi-judicial mechanism. For policy architecture, this calls for a thorough restructuring of statutory jurisdictions, bringing under one umbrella contradictory portions of the Information Technology Act, Competition Act, and Consumer Protection Act. Lawmakers should envision a centralized enforcement mechanism that is institutionally vested with expertise and is able to render expeditious adjudications of disputes in a binding manner and to carry out a continuous audit of international digital entities and thereby resolve any over- lapping administrative responsibilities.

12.2.Transforming statutory regimes from ex-post to ex-ante market regulation

The policy recommendations from the paper would require legislatures to transition from an ex-post system of antitrust dispute to an ex-ante system. Future digital trade legislation must create baseline rules restricting platform self-preferencing and data pooling in an attempt to break down the platform neutrality paradox before market power can be exerted harmfully. This would demand a retooling of regulatory regimes that would proactively limit the behaviour that gigantic e-commerce firms can do so as to break up their simultaneous operations as marketplaces and they're as retailers.

13.Future Areas of Work

13.1.Empirical Assessment of Proposed Centralised Body

The study identifies the theoretical and legal justification for the existence of a quasi-judicial centralized body; however future research is required in to the operational efficacy and effectiveness of the same. The following studies should be implemented with regard to dispute resolution time limits, enforcement efficiency, bottlenecks faced by this proposed centralized regulatory body. Evaluating the performance of this initial stage is important in order to further develop and implement appropriate enforcement jurisdictions and to address any new bureaucratic pitfalls of a centralized model.

13.2.Building Standardized Techno-Legal Auditing Frameworks

Given the need for new methods and metrics to unmask algorithmic bias and the hidden presence of dark patterns in choice architecture, the future of behavioural antitrust lies in the creation of techno-legal auditing techniques. These will need to provide standardized, interdisciplinary, inter-firm approaches grounded in computer science, which will be usable by regulators for empirically analysing the impact of choice architectures. By introducing such metrics for an objective, evidence-based auditing practice, behavioural antitrust can be transformed from a moral-philosophical principle into law.

13.3.Implications of Shared Vicarious Liability on MSMEs

The introduction of shared vicarious liability replacing safe harbour rules will create further regulatory hurdles for MSMEs that could marginalize them further in the economy. A future socio-economic analysis should explore how enhanced due diligence and mandated, auto product guarantees might affect MSMEs entering or operating on domestic digital markets and what measures should be taken to level the playing field to safeguard consumer protections without entrenching digital exclusion.

13.4.Expanding Studies on Algorithmic Discrimination

Despite the focused attention on gender-based pink tax discrimination, the legal academia needs to broaden the study of these developing forms of pricing discrimination in digital marketplace spaces, to focus on pricing algorithms that exploit vulnerabilities related to where the consumer is or what device, computer, device type or internet history they may be browsing or utilize or their socio-economic position; and to broaden these analyses to facilitate a full and encompassing understanding of all currently existing and ever-expanding unfair forms of profiling occurring by unregulated algorithms.

13.5.Scale of human-centred grievances redressing

Mandating person-to-person customer support to supersede automated (AI) based grievances may be an economically and administratively burdensome prospect to transnational platforms. Further work is needed to study the economic scale of deploying human in the loop systems which would cater for the interests of consumers while being feasible to the businesses concerned. Works in the field of designing hybrid grievance systems may, for the time being, propose ways in which the mediation between human and machine in resolving dispute may be adopted in a manner compliant to the statutory provision.

13.6.Conformity Between domestic Laws and international trade laws

Since this study will propose a legal framework at a domestic level in India, there is room for further legal research at a future stage to clarify the mechanism through which this codified statue can be implemented over trans-national platforms. It is imperative to understand the conflicts in jurisdiction and legal clashes that might exist between ex-ante Indian regulations and the provisions under international trade agreements related to digital commerce. Develop strategies that reconcile the tight domestic behavioural antitrust regulations with international treaty provisions without imposing impediments to foreign direct investment.

13.7.Data Privacy and Platform Neutrality

A Convergence of Issues Addressing the platform neutrality paradox means more accurately interrogating how hyper-sized digital gatekeepers use personal consumer data on private platforms as inputs for algorithmic self-preferencing. Further research must meticulously investigate the structural intersection of e-commerce governance with the burgeoning data protection regime, particularly data portability rules and data pooling constraints. Analysing how data monopolies create direct competition benefits in the retail sector, in turn creating specific policy mechanisms and regulations for regulators to rigorously enforce data silos in dual-role marketplaces.

13.8.Technology as Enforcement of Product Accountability

The future interdisciplinary work required will, in order to enable these suggested prohibitions on dangerous products and total item return, examine the range of technologies regulators can employ for its enforcement. This includes examining how the centralized body may utilise Blockchain technology, Smart Contracts and sophisticated AI to oversee the entire chain and ensure products meet their criteria automatically. Through such technologically implemented enforcement mechanisms, strict supplier checks and product guarantees will become a reality for consumers.

14.Conclusion

While this paper establishes the vital legal blueprint for centralized e-commerce governance, it also delineates critical pathways for future scholarly and legislative work. The effective realization of this proposed statute relies on subsequent empirical evaluations to quantify the logistical viability of universal returnability and the true economic impact of dismantling the platform neutrality paradox on Small Medium Enterprise (SME) growth. Furthermore, bridging the disciplines of law and computer science will be paramount to developing the objective techno legal auditing standards required by the quasi-judicial authority to detect dark patterns and algorithmic bias. Codifying such protections into a single, updated legal instrument will finally ensure India’s digital trade regime adapts to the 21st century-with integrity, robust accountability and unparalleled consumer confidence.

As India approaches the conclusion of its legal overhaul, the institution of an independent, quasi-judicial E-Commerce Tribunal cannot simply be seen as domestic market governance; it marks the definitive and, critically, the first regulatory framework designed for the Global South. As developing economies face greater difficulty addressing the monopolistic inclinations and digital neo-colonialism of global platforms, India’s movement from reactive safe harbours towards prescriptive, vicarious liability establishes a workable model for reasserting digital sovereignty. The statute thus conceived is not merely intended to hold profiteers accountable; it intends to foster a viable and innovation-centric digital bazaar where rapid progress of technology is inseparable from inclusive policy. The establishment of this omnibus code is therefore the unequivocal and only appropriate way to distribute the benefits of India's digital renaissance, thereby protecting consumer autonomy and enabling Indian businesses to prosper globally.

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